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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	UMG RECORDINGS, INC.,	) NO. CV 07-05808 SJO (FFMx)
12	Plaintiff,	ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
	<b>v</b> .	) FOR ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS, ) RESTRAINING ORDER, AND TURNOVER
13	BCD MUSIC GROUP, INC.,	ORDER Docket No. 215]
14	Defendant.	) )
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This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff UMG Recordings, Inc.'s ("UMG") Motion for Assignment of Rights, Restraining Order, and Turnover Order, filed June 1, 2009. Defendant BCD Music Group, Inc. ("BCD") filed an Opposition, to which UMG replied. The Court found this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and vacated the hearing set for July 6, 2009. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). Because of the following reasons, UMG's Motion is GRANTED.

# I. <u>BACKGROUND</u>

In January 2009, pursuant to UMG and BCD's settlement agreement, BCD stipulated to an entry of judgment against it in the amount of \$7.2 million, for willful infringement of 43 of UMG's copyrighted sound recordings. (Judgment, Docket No. 199.) As part of the settlement agreement, UMG agreed to refrain from enforcing the judgment against BCD if it paid UMG \$2.2 million, consisting of \$1 million on or before March 12, 2009, and an additional \$100,000 per month for the subsequent twelve months. (Tr. 5:22-6:2, Jan. 12, 2009.) UMG and BCD agreed that "in the event that at some point during the payment process the defendant is late on a payment, the

entire judgment would then become fully enforceable . . . ." (Tr. 6:20-25, Jan. 12, 2009.) UMG asserts, and BCD does not deny, that BCD failed to make any payments to UMG under the settlement agreement and now has failed to make any payment in fulfillment of the judgment against it. (See Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. 2; Def.'s Opp'n 2 (noting that UMG has failed to collect any of the judgment against BCD because of "deficiencies" in UMG's request).)

Due to BCD's failure to make the required payments to UMG, UMG filed a Motion for Assignment of Rights, Restraining Order, and Turnover Order seeking to enforce the judgment. (See Pl.'s Apr. 14, 2009 Mot..) The Court denied without prejudice UMG's request for an assignment of rights and a restraining order due to the general nature of the request and lack of specificity in regard to the assets UMG sought. (Order of May 22, 2009 at 3-4.) Additionally, the Court denied without prejudice the turnover order request as UMG failed to obtain a writ of execution before filing the motion. *Id.* In the instant Motion, UMG seeks to cure any deficiencies in its original motion in order to reach assets that may fulfill some of the \$7.2 million judgment against BCD.

### II. <u>DISCUSSION</u>

The execution of final judgments is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 69(a), which provides: "A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise. The procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies." Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a). The California Code of Civil Procedure (the "Code") provides that "after entry of a money judgment, a writ of execution shall be issued by the clerk of the court upon application of the judgment creditor . . . . " Cal. Code Civ. P. § 699.510. The Code further provides procedures for the assignment of assets, issuance of restraining orders, and issuance of turnover orders as discussed in more detail below.

#### A. Assignment Order

"Upon application of the judgment creditor on noticed motion, the court may order the judgment debtor to assign to the judgment creditor . . . all or part of a right to payment due or to become due, whether or not the right is conditional upon future developments." Cal. Code Civ.

P. § 708.510. "[I]n determining whether to order an assignment or the amount of an assignment pursuant to subdivision (a), the court may take into consideration all relevant factors," including "the amount remaining due on the money judgment . . . [and] [t]he amount being or to be received in satisfaction of the right to payment that may be assigned." §§ 708.510(c)(3)-(4). "A right to payment may be assigned pursuant to this article only to the extent necessary to satisfy the money judgment." § 708.510(d). "Although the Court may take into consideration all relevant factors, the sole constraints placed on the Court are that the right to payment be assigned only to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's money judgment and that, where part of the payments are exempt, the amount of payments assigned should not exceed the difference between the gross amount of the payments and the exempt amount." Sleepy Hollow Inv. Co. No. 2 v. Prototek, Inc., No. 03-4792, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35479, at \*6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2006). The California Legislature explained in creating § 708.510 that it "provides a new procedure for reaching certain forms of property that cannot be reached by levy under writ of execution . . . . It also provides an optional procedure for reaching assignable forms of property that are subject to levy, such as accounts receivable . . . . This remedy may be used alone or in conjunction with other remedies provided in this title for reaching rights to payment, such as execution . . . . " Legislative Committee Comment to Cal. Code. Civ. P. § 708.510.

In its original motion, UMG requested an assignment of "all accounts, accounts receivable, rights to payment of money, contract rights, rights to payment of money from third parties, contingent rights, deposits and deposit accounts, claims against third parties, monies due from third parties, due and in favor of and for the benefit of [BCD] or any of [BCD]'s partners, assignees, and other persons acting on his behalf." (Pl.'s [Proposed] Order 1-2, Apr. 14, 2009.) The Court rejected UMG's assignment request because of its generality and failure to identify any specific assets. See Order of May 22, 2009 at 3; Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. v. Briano, No. 06-1270, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95086, at \*3-4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2007) (request for a "general assignment of funds" is not sufficient to allow the court to consider the factors for assignment listed in § 708.510(c)). The Garden City court explained that "where a judgment creditor can identify a person or entity which is obligated to make payment to the judgment debtor, and where that 'right

to payment' is assignable, the right to payment can be assigned from a third party obligor to the judgment creditor." *Id.* at \*4 (citing *Quaestor Invs., Inc. v. State of Chiapas*, No. CV-95-6723 JGD (AJWx), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24271, at \*15-16 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1997)) (emphasis in original).

In the instant Motion, UMG has provided the Court with a list of specific third parties from which it seeks the assignment of payment rights and accounts receivable. (See Pl.'s Mot. ¶ 1; Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. 3.) UMG explains that these entities are "probable distributors, purchasers and/or customers of the Defendant's products," and "would ostensibly owe BCD for the acquisition of digital rights, licensing of certain songs and compositions and other rights." *Id.* Notably, BCD does not contest that the companies UMG identified owe payments to BCD, and instead argues only that UMG's list is "speculative" and was "apparently developed with no evidentiary support." (See Def.'s Opp'n. 4.) However, the legal standard imposed by § 708.510 does not obligate UMG to provide detailed evidentiary support for its request. See § 708.510(a). Moreover, nearly six months after BCD stipulated to the entry and payment of the \$7.2 million judgment, BCD continues to ignore its obligations to compensate UMG for its illegal infringement activity. (See Judgment, Docket No. 199; Pl.'s Mem. P & A. 2; Def.'s Opp'n 2.) As BCD has given the Court no reason to doubt that the entities UMG identified owe payments to BCD, and in light of BCD's blatant disregard for its obligation to satisfy the judgment against it, the Court GRANTS UMG's Motion for an assignment order, as specified below.

# B. Restraining Order

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"When an application is made pursuant to § 708.510 or thereafter, the judgment creditor may apply to the court for an order restraining the judgment debtor from assigning or otherwise disposing of the right to payment that is sought to be assigned . . . . The court may issue an order pursuant to this section upon a showing of need for the order." Cal. Code Civ. P. § 708.520. Courts have issued restraining orders "so that [the assigned rights to payment] might be available for satisfaction of the judgment." *See Sleepy Hollow, Inv. Co. No. 2*, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35479, at \*9.

Here, BCD's conduct in defaulting on the payment program under the settlement agreement, and refusing to voluntarily satisfy the judgment against it, demonstrates a need to

protect the assigned rights to payment from transfer or disposition by BCD. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS UMG's Motion for a restraining order, as specified below.

## C. <u>Turnover Order</u>

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"If a writ of execution is issued, the judgment creditor may apply to the court . . . for an order directing the judgment debtor to transfer to the levying officer either or both of the following: (1) possession of the property sought to be levied upon if the property is sought to be levied upon by taking it into custody; (2) possession of documentary evidence of title to property or a debt owed to the judgment debtor that is sought to be levied upon. . . . The court may issue an order pursuant to this section upon a showing of need for the order." Cal. Code Civ. P. § 699.040.

The Court denied UMG's first motion for a turnover order because UMG had failed to meet § 699.040's procedural requirement of obtaining a writ of execution. See Cal. Code Civ. P. § 699.040. UMG has since obtained the necessary writ of execution (see Writ of Execution of May 15, 2009), and now moves for a turnover order covering "any and all documentary evidence of any accounts, including but not limited to, any checks, drafts, money orders, deposits, deposit accounts, books, records, papers or files, listing of accounts, accounts receivable ledgers or journals" linked to the accounts and accounts receivable identified in the assignment order. (Pl.'s Mot. ¶ 3; Pl.s' Reply 9.) As UMG notes, a turnover order is necessary to prevent BCD from frustrating the purpose behind the assignment order, and to "put teeth in an assignment order in compelling the debtor to turn over the profits and proceeds of the receivables." (Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. 7; Pl.'s Reply 9.) The Court finds a turnover order appropriate to help curtail BCD's dilatory tactics and give effect to the assignment order, and finds that BCD's behavior in refusing to pay any portion of the settlement amount or judgment suffices to demonstrate the need for such an order. Thus, the Court GRANTS UMG's Motion for a turnover order, as specified below.

### D. <u>Personal Jurisdiction Over the Assignable Assets</u>

BCD objects to UMG's Motion on the ground that "to the extent UMG's proposed Order purports to require out-of-state third parties to deliver or pay over any property directly to UMG, UMG has failed to demonstrate that this Court has personal jurisdiction over such parties to issue such an order." (Def.'s Opp'n 5.) BCD contends that "to the extent [the Court's Order] requires

nonresident third persons to assign rights to payment without a demonstration that this Court possesses the requisite personal jurisdiction over them, [the Order] would be null and void." Id. However, the assignment order does not require any third parties to assign rights to payment, but rather requires BCD itself to assign its rights to payment from third parties to UMG. When a court has personal jurisdiction over an individual defendant, it also has jurisdiction over the defendant's property. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 8 (1909); see also Legion for the Survival of Freedom v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11549, at \*13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (unpublished) (upholding lower court's assignment under § 708.510 of out-of-state property, explaining that "it is settled in this state that courts have the power to indirectly affect out-of-state property by means of a decree, based on personal jurisdiction over the parties, which determines the parties' personal rights or equities in that property"). Further, BCD's citation to Hardy v. Hardy, 164 Cal. App. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958), is unconvincing. In Hardy, the court in a divorce proceeding imposed a lien on an out-of-state spendthrift trust to which the husband-defendant was the beneficiary, to secure payment to the wife-plaintiff of alimony, child support, court costs and attorney fees. Id. The reviewing court held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the trust because in that particular case, "the purported imposition of the lien [could] in no way be considered other than as an attempt by a court of this state to affect title to land in Illinois." Id. at 79. However, the court also explained that "a court having the parties before it can, in a proper case, through its coercive powers, compel them to act in relation to property not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court." Id. (citing Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. at 8). It is unclear exactly how Hardy affects the instant Motion, and BCD offers no explanation. Moreover, Hardy did not concern an assignment order pursuant to § 708.510. Because there is no dispute that the Court has jurisdiction over BCD in the present matter, the Court thus has "the power to indirectly affect out-of-state property by means of a decree, based on personal jurisdiction over the parties, which determines the parties' personal rights or equities in that property." See Legion for the Survival of Freedom, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11549, at \*13. Accordingly, the Court may properly order BCD to assign its rights to payment from out-of-state third parties.

III. Ruling

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assignment herein.

(3) Defendant BCD shall deliver all checks, cash, notes, instruments, deposits, deposit accounts, drafts, and accounts receivable ledgers or journals, pertaining to the items identified in paragraph (1) to the Marshal, Central District of California, 255 E. Temple Street, Room 346, Third Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90012-4798. IT IS SO ORDERED. 5. Jame Otens Dated: July 9, 2009. S. JAMES OTERO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE